┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
  RECORD TYPE ......... ANNOTATION — SOURCED RECORD
  REGISTRY NO. ........ MARG-0571
  SLUG ................ /us-government-warrantless-commercial-location-data-justifications
  STATUS .............. ACTIVE
  FILED ............... 2026-06-21 19:25 UTC
  LAST ANNOTATED ...... 2026-06-21 19:25 UTC
  CLAIMS ON FILE ...... 8
  MEAN TAG CONFIDENCE . 0.80
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
PENDING

US Government Justifications for Warrantless Commercial Location Data Purchases

This dossier examines the legal arguments presented by the U.S. government when defending its practice of purchasing commercial location data from data brokers without obtaining a warrant. The practice, widely reported since 2020, allows federal agencies to access sensitive location information that might otherwise require a Fourth Amendment warrant if collected directly from telecommunication companies. Critics, including the ACLU and legal scholars, allege that this constitutes an 'end-run' around constitutional protections, specifically the Supreme Court's ruling in *Carpenter v. United States* (2018), which held that the government generally needs a warrant to access cell-site location information. Government arguments often center on the 'third-party doctrine' and the idea that commercially purchased data is distinct from data directly requested from service providers.

The strongest argument for the government's position is that individuals voluntarily share their location data with third-party commercial entities (e.g., app developers, data brokers). Under the 'third-party doctrine,' individuals generally lose a reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily shared with third parties. Therefore, the government's purchase of this data from commercial sources, rather than directly compelling its production from service providers, does not constitute a 'search' under the Fourth Amendment, negating the need for a warrant.

The strongest counter-argument posits that the scale, invasiveness, and sensitivity of aggregated commercial location data fundamentally differ from other types of information covered by the traditional third-party doctrine. Critics argue that regardless of how the data is acquired by the government, the profound privacy implications of continuously tracked movements, especially when aggregated over time, should trigger Fourth Amendment protections. They contend that the Supreme Court's decision in *Carpenter v. United States* specifically recognized the unique privacy interests in cell-site location information, which should logically extend to commercially purchased location data, effectively making the data purchase an 'end-run' around warrant requirements.

  1. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.80

    The Constitution permits warrantless agency purchases of sensitive, invasive data, regardless of whether users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data.

    — attributed to: Yale Law and Policy Review

    • https://yalelawandpolicy.org/end-running-warrants-purchasing-data-under-fourth-amendment-and-state-action-problem
  2. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.70

    The purchased location information is different from the cell phone location data at issue in *Carpenter v. United States*.

    — attributed to: DHS (alleged in an internal memo)

    • https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/dhs-is-circumventing-constitution-by-buying-data-it-would-normally-need-a-warrant-to-access
  3. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.90

    Government agencies are circumventing the Constitution by buying data they would normally need a warrant to access.

    — attributed to: ACLU

    • https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/dhs-is-circumventing-constitution-by-buying-data-it-would-normally-need-a-warrant-to-access
  4. VERIFIEDCONF 1.00

    The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.

    — attributed to: U.S. Courts

    • https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/what-does-fourth-amendment-mean
  5. CORROBORATEDCONF 0.90

    *Carpenter v. United States* established that phone companies cannot give location data to the government without a warrant per the Fourth Amendment.

    — attributed to: Instagram user

    • https://www.instagram.com/reel/DYZokyUDbYI/
  6. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.70

    The government does not need to spy on citizens because it can buy their information legally without needing warrants, including location and credit card purchases.

    — attributed to: Reddit user

    • https://www.reddit.com/r/technology/comments/1rxzv9x/fbi_admits_buying_americans_location_data_and/
  7. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.70

    The government claims broad rights to search people's electronic devices at the border, without a warrant or probable cause.

    — attributed to: ACLU lawyers (Reddit AMA)

    • https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/7acr28/were_aclu_lawyers_going_to_the_supreme_court_to/
  8. SINGLE-SOURCECONF 0.70

    The government purchases data on individuals and claims it is not violating rights because they didn't 'collect' it directly.

    — attributed to: Reddit user

    • https://www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive/comments/1irnemr/eli5_exactly_why_data_collection_is_such_a_big/
  • 2018Supreme Court rules in *Carpenter v. United States*, establishing that a warrant is generally required for the government to access historical cell-site location information. [src]
  • 2020Public reporting documents U.S. government agencies purchasing commercial location data without warrants.
  • 2026-01-12ACLU reports that DHS memo claims purchased location data is different from *Carpenter* data. [src]
  • ORG U.S. GovernmentPurchaser of data, defendant in legal arguments
  • EVENT Fourth AmendmentConstitutional protection against unreasonable searches
  • EVENT Carpenter v. United StatesSupreme Court case establishing warrant requirement for cell-site location data
  • ORG ACLUCivil liberties advocate, critic of warrantless data purchases
  • ORG Department of Homeland Security (DHS)Government agency accused of purchasing location data
  • ORG FBIGovernment agency accused of purchasing location data
  • ORG Data BrokersCommercial entities selling location data
  • What specific legal filings or memorandums from the Department of Justice or other federal agencies articulate the government's official legal arguments for purchasing commercial location data without warrants?
  • Have there been any federal court decisions, lower than the Supreme Court, that have directly addressed the legality of the U.S. government's warrantless purchase of commercial location data?
  • What are the specific, detailed distinctions the DHS memo makes between the location data at issue in *Carpenter v. United States* and commercially purchased location data?
  • Which federal agencies have admitted to purchasing commercial location data, and for what stated purposes have they used this data?
  • Are there any legislative proposals in the U.S. Congress aimed at regulating government access to or purchase of commercial location data?
  1. [WEB] https://yalelawandpolicy.org/end-running-warrants-purchasing-data-under-fourth-amendment-and-state-action-problem [archived]
    the Constitution permits warrantless agency purchases of sensitive, invasive data, regardless of whether users have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the ...
  2. [WEB] https://www.aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/dhs-is-circumventing-constitution-by-buying-data-it-would-normally-need-a-warrant-to-access [archived]
    12 Jan 2026 · The memo claims that the purchased location information is different from the cell phone location data at issue in Carpenter v. United States, ...
  3. [WEB] https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/what-does-fourth-amendment-mean
    What Does the Fourth Amendment Mean? The Constitution, through the Fourth Amendment, protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.
  4. [WEB] https://yalelawjournal.org/article/the-un-territoriality-of-data [archived]
    23 Nov 2015 · Specifically, it argues that a territorial-based Fourth Amendment fails to adequately protect “the people” it is intended to cover.
  5. [WEB] https://www.instagram.com/reel/DYZokyUDbYI/
    16 May 2026 · United States that phone companies can't give your location data to the government without a warrant per the Fourth Amendment. So how are ...
  6. [WEB] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/08/2024-31486/preventing-access-to-us-sensitive-personal-data-and-government-related-data-by-countries-of-concern [archived]
    8 Jan 2025 · It prescribes forward-looking, categorical rules that prevent U.S. persons from providing countries of concern or covered persons access to ...
  7. [WEB] https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/corporate-responsibility/reports/government-requests/customer-data
    We publish the number of legal demands for customer data that we receive from governments around the world. Explore the reports and data we have compiled.
  8. [WEB] https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/glossary [archived]
    The Legal Terms Glossary defines over 100 of the most common legal terms in easy-to-understand language.
  9. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/ArtificialInteligence/comments/1i5udip/im_a_lawyer_ai_has_changed_my_legal_practice/ [archived]
    20 Jan 2025 · It's winning and losing using case law, connections and analysis. That's it. Ain't no ethics or morals involved in the American legal system.
  10. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/technology/comments/1rxzv9x/fbi_admits_buying_americans_location_data_and/
    20 Mar 2026 · The government doesn't need to spy on us; it can buy that information legally without needing warrants. Location, credit card purchases, social ...
  11. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/privacy/comments/1gxil8n/fbi_requested_my_data_from_google_without_my/
    22 Nov 2024 · Government can access your data under various circumstances that are permitted by law (national security, public safety etc) and the data ...
  12. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/drones/comments/1fjasvf/im_adam_welsh_global_head_of_policy_for_dji_ama/ [archived]
    17 Sept 2024 · So, for example, if a US agency asks about drones flying in Mexico, we tell them we need a warrant from the Mexican authorities. With that being ...
  13. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/comments/7acr28/were_aclu_lawyers_going_to_the_supreme_court_to/ [archived]
    2 Nov 2017 · The government claims broad rights to search people's electronic devices at the border, without a warrant or probable cause. We think that ...
  14. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/sysadmin/comments/1g0kft7/lets_migrate_to_the_cloud_the_most_recent_emails/ [archived]
    10 Oct 2024 · IT either needs to do what you said and respond that the data is not restorable (and then not restore it), or find a way to restore it, but ...
  15. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/explainlikeimfive/comments/1irnemr/eli5_exactly_why_data_collection_is_such_a_big/ [archived]
    17 Feb 2025 · The government then purchases that data on us, and says, we didn't collect it, so we aren't violating your rights. We are way, way past ...
  16. [REDDIT] https://www.reddit.com/r/eupersonalfinance/comments/wh6yxy/n26_just_closed_my_account_and_kept_all_my_savings/ [archived]
    5 Aug 2022 · Hi, I am looking for help with my European bank, N26. This is my only European bank and I live in Germany. They closed my account without ...
Government Purchase of Commercial Location Data: Warrantless Surveillance Via Data Broker Loophole — SHARES-EVENT (OUTGOING)GOVERNMENT PURCHASE OF CO…US Government Justifications for Warrantless Commercial Location Data PurchasesUS GOVERNMENT JUSTIFICATION…THIS FILESHARES-EVENT